The Burning Fertility Clinic Argument Is Not Convincing

[Today’s guest article is by Alexander Hyun.]

If you must choose between saving one newborn and saving five human embryos that are only a few days old, it’s intuitive that you morally ought to save the newborn. This observation forms the basis of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument, a well-known type of argument against the view that very young human embryos are people, or beings with basic moral rights of the sort that you and I have. In what follows, I present and critique two versions of this argument. The first version, which is the popular one, is easily refuted. The second version is formidable and should be taken seriously by pro-lifers, but I argue that it is ultimately unconvincing. 

A Popular Version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument

Consider the following thought experiment:

Burning Fertility Clinic 1

You come across a fertility clinic that’s burning down. You peer through the window and see the situation at a glance: lying on the floor, there’s a newborn baby and a canister of five frozen human embryos that are a few days old, and you don’t have time to rescue both of them. You must choose between rescuing the newborn and rescuing the embryos. 

It seems obvious that you morally ought to save the newborn, and this suggests the following argument against the personhood of human embryos:

(1) If human embryos are people, then you’re morally required to rescue the embryos rather than the newborn in Burning Fertility Clinic 1.

(2) It’s not true that you’re morally required to save the embryos rather than the newborn in Burning Fertility Clinic 1.

(3) So, human embryos are not people.

This argument is logically valid ‒ that is, the conclusion must be true if both of the premises are true. Premise (2) strikes many people, including many pro-life people, as obviously correct. So far as I can see, the support for premise (1) is supposed to go as follows. If human embryos are people, then Burning Fertility Clinic 1 is a case in which you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people (the embryos) from a lethal threat and rescuing a smaller group of people (the baby) from that threat. And in general, if you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people from a lethal threat and rescuing a smaller group of people from that threat, then you are morally required to rescue the larger group of people. It follows from the preceding reasoning that if human embryos are people, then you are morally required to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 1, just as premise (1) says.

Why the Popular Version of the Argument is Not Convincing

This version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument isn’t convincing because there’s no good reason to accept premise (1). As I mentioned, the line of reasoning in support of this premise relies on the following principle:

Rescue Principle 1: If you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people from a lethal threat and rescuing a smaller group of people from that threat, then you are morally required to rescue the larger group of people.

But this principle is mistaken. To see why, notice that there are sometimes strong moral reasons to save the smaller group of people. The folks at the Equal Rights Institute identify two such reasons. First, there’s a moral reason to save the smaller group of people when only the people in that group would suffer a painful, terrifying death were you to refrain from saving them. And second, there’s a moral reason to save the smaller group of people when the people in that group are more likely to survive injuries they’ve already sustained were you to save them from the immediate danger.  

These observations suggest counter-examples to Rescue Principle 1, such as the following:

Burning Fertility Clinic 2

You have to choose between saving a group of five people and saving a group of six people from a burning building. The six people are in temporary comas, and so they wouldn’t experience a painful and terrifying death were you to refrain from saving them, whereas the five people are wide awake. Further, the six people in comas have already inhaled so much smoke that it is virtually certain that they would soon die even if you were to save them from the fire, whereas the five people are likely to live a long time if they are saved from the fire. 

This is a case in which you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people from a lethal threat and rescuing a smaller group of people from that threat. So, if Rescue Principle 1 is true, then you are morally required to rescue the larger group of people in this case. But it’s hard to believe that this is what you’re morally required to do. It seems obvious that you ought to save the smaller group of people in this case. So, Rescue Principle 1 is false. And since the support for premise (1) relies on Rescue Principle 1, this means that there’s no good reason to accept premise (1). And so, this version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument is unconvincing.

The fact that this version of the argument is so easy to refute is significant because it is a charitable interpretation of the version of the argument that you’re most likely to see offered by pro-choice advocates. For example, it’s a charitable interpretation of the argument that Patrick Tomlinson offers in a series of tweets that renewed popular interest in the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument several years ago. 

A Formidable Version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument

One way to revise this pro-choice argument so that it doesn’t rely on the problematic Rescue Principle 1 is to modify the thought experiment so that the newborn and the embryos are so similar that unless the newborn is a person while the embryos are not, there is no strong moral reason to save the newborn rather than the embryos. Here’s the modified case:

Burning Fertility Clinic 3

This case is just like Burning Fertility Clinic 1, except for the following details. First, the newborn is in a temporary coma. She would not experience a painful, terrifying death were you to fail to save her. Second, the newborn has the same kidney ailment that afflicts the famous violinist in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s thought experiment. Someone must attach himself to the newborn for nine months or the baby will die. Third, assume equal probabilities for people volunteering to accept the nine-month responsibilities of the newborn and the embryos. Both newborn and embryos therefore have equal probabilities of living flourishing lives if they are saved from the fire. Finally, assume that nobody has formed a close relationship with either newborn or embryos. No third party will suffer emotional anguish from their deaths.  You must choose whether to save the five embryos or the comatose newborn.

It still seems plausible that you morally ought to save the newborn, and this suggests the following version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument:

(1)* If human embryos are people, then you’re morally required to rescue the embryos rather than the newborn in Burning Fertility Clinic 3.

(2)* It’s not true that you’re morally required to save the embryos rather than the newborn in Burning Fertility Clinic 3.

(3)* So, human embryos are not people.

The Revised Argument is logically valid. Premise (1)* finds support with the following compelling argument: If human embryos are people, then Burning Fertility Clinic 3 is a case in which it is true both that (i) you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people (the embryos) and a smaller group of people (the newborn), and (ii) there are no differences between the people in these two groups that give you strong moral reason to save the smaller group. Rescue Principle 2 applies in this case:

Rescue Principle 2: If you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people from a lethal threat and rescuing a smaller group of people from that threat, and if there are no differences between the people in the larger group and the people in the smaller group that gives you a strong moral reason to save the smaller group, then you are morally required to rescue the larger group of people.

It follows from the foregoing reasoning that if human embryos are people, then you are morally required to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3, just as premise (1)* says. 

Note that since the Revised Argument relies on Rescue Principle 2 instead of on Rescue Principle 1, it’s not vulnerable to the problem that afflicts the popular version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument. 

The Revised Argument bears similarities to the  arguments defended by philosophers Kate Greasley and Rob Lovering and the argument critiqued by pro-life philosopher David Hershenov. Unlike the popular version of the argument, the Revised Argument poses a serious challenge to the pro-life position. 

But pro-lifers can meet this challenge.

Why the Revised Argument is Not Convincing

Before I give my main rebuttal to the Revised Argument, it’s worth mentioning that some people will think that there is a very easy rebuttal to this argument: premise (2)* is not obviously true. Pro-lifers who disagree with (2)* will reject the Revised Argument. 

Even pro-lifers who are initially inclined to agree with (2)* are likely to find it less intuitively plausible than premise (2) of the popular version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument. Arguments for affirming human embryos’ personhood, such as the Equal Rights Argument, may be sufficient to convince them that (2)* is false. 

But let’s set aside these possible responses to the Revised Argument and consider another way that the pro-lifer can respond. I’ll argue that the Revised Argument faces a dilemma which casts serious doubt on at least one of the Revised Argument’s premises.

Let’s start by considering one final case:

Burning Fertility Clinic 4

This case is just like Burning Fertility Clinic 3, except that instead of there being five frozen embryos in the canister, there are five frozen fetuses that were transferred to the canister from their mothers at 10 weeks gestation. Aside from being more developed than the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3, these fetuses resemble the embryos in every way. For example, these fetuses can continue to develop only if people volunteer to have them transferred to their uteruses so that they can finish gestating. There are doctors who are willing and able to perform these transplants, but the probability that somebody will volunteer to assist one of the fetuses with gestation is the same as the probability that someone will volunteer to have one of the embryos transplanted into her uterus. You must choose whether to save the five fetuses or the one comatose newborn who suffers from Thomson’s kidney ailment.

The dilemma I’ll develop centers around this question: Do you have stronger moral reasons to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4 than you have to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3? I don’t know the answer to this question. But I do know that the correct answer is either ‘yes’ or ‘no.’ I’ll argue that whichever of these two answers is correct, the Revised Argument faces serious problems.

Here’s the first horn of the dilemma. Assume that the correct answer to the above question is ‘no.’ That is, assume for the moment that you do not have stronger moral reasons to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4 than you have to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3. It seems clear that you also don’t have stronger moral reasons to rescue the embryos than you have to rescue the fetuses. So, it must be that your moral reasons to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4 are equally strong as your moral reasons to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3. This means that if it’s plausible that you’re morally required to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4, then i’’s also plausible that you’re morally required to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3. 

And I submit that it is plausible that you are morally required to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4. Just look at this image of a fetus that has reached 10 weeks gestation. And these. (For an explanation of how Dr. Brad Smith created these images, see here.) Even if it’s not completely obvious that you ought to save five frozen fetuses that look like this instead of saving one comatose newborn who suffers from Thomson’s kidney ailment, it’s at least plausible that you ought to save the five fetuses. So, it’s also plausible that you’re morally required to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3. This seriously undermines premise (2)*, which was supported only by an appeal to intuition. 

Now let’s move to the second horn of the dilemma. Assume for the moment that you do have stronger moral reasons to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4 than you have to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3. This must mean that there is some morally relevant difference between the 10-week-old fetuses and the embryos. That is, there must be some morally important feature ‒ call it “F” ‒ which fetuses possess and embryos lack. 

Which feature is F? It’s hard to think of plausible candidates. It’s unlikely that F is a psychological feature like consciousness or the capacity to feel pain, for it’s unlikely that either the fetuses or the embryos have such psychological features. It’s also unlikely that F is the feature of being a person, for all of the most plausible philosophical theories about when a human being counts as a person either imply that both the fetuses and the embryos are people or imply that neither of them are.¹

The most plausible view is that F is some physical feature that only the fetuses possess, such as having a developing human brain or physical resemblance to an infant.

However, if F is a physical feature, then there’s excellent reason to doubt premise (1)*. To see why, suppose that F is the physical feature of having a developing human brain. If this is the nature of F, that means that possession of a developing human brain increases an organism’s moral importance. If that is true, then there’s a difference between the embryos and the baby in Burning Fertility Clinic 3 that gives you a moral reason to save the baby. That difference is that the baby, unlike the embryos, has a developing human brain. And this difference exists even if human embryos are people. 

These observations undermine the following premise in the argument for (1)*: If human embryos are people, then Burning Fertility Clinic 3 is a case in which it is true both that (i) you must choose between rescuing a larger group of people (the embryos) and a smaller group of people (the baby), and (ii) there are no differences between the people in these two groups that give you strong moral reason to save the smaller group. This claim is doubtful because we should think that if human embryos are people, then there is a difference between the people in the two groups in Burning Fertility Clinic 3 that give you strong moral reason to save the smaller group. So, since F is the feature of having a developing human brain, there’s decisive reason to reject the argument for premise (1)*, and this makes premise (1)* subject to serious doubt. 

A line of reasoning paralleling the one set forth in the preceding two paragraphs can be constructed for all of the other physical features that F might be, such as the feature of physically resembling a human infant.

Here’s a summary of the entire dilemma. You either do have stronger moral reasons to rescue the fetuses in Burning Fertility Clinic 4 than you have to rescue the embryos in Burning Fertility Clinic 3, or you don’t. If you don’t, then premise (2)* is doubtful. And if you do, then premise (1)* is doubtful. Either way, at least one premise of the Revised Argument is subject to serious doubt. 

In this article, we’ve considered two versions of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument: the popular version of the argument and the Revised Argument. The popular version is easily refuted since it appeals to a false principle about the ethics of rescuing (Rescue Principle 1). The Revised Argument avoids this problem, for it appeals to a correct principle about the ethics of rescuing (Rescue Principle 2). Yet the Revised Argument also fails, for it faces a dilemma that shows that at least one of its main premises is subject to serious doubt. Until pro-choice advocates offer a better version of the Burning Fertility Clinic Argument, it remains unconvincing.

¹ Consider two examples. First, pro-choice philosopher David Boonin argues that the human beings that are persons are the ones that have desires, and he argues that human beings don’t have desires until at least 25 weeks after fertilization. This view implies that neither the 10-week-old fetuses nor the embryos are people. Second, pro-life philosophers Patrick Lee and Robert George argue that the human beings that count as persons are the ones that have ‘a rational nature,’ or ‘the natural capacity to reason and make free choices, a capacity that ordinarily takes months, or even years, to actualize.’ Since all human beings have a rational nature, their view implies that both the 10-week-old fetuses and the embryos are people.

[Photo credit: Chris Karidis on Unsplash]

If you appreciate our work and would like to help, one of the most effective ways to do so is to become a monthly donor. You can also give a one time donation here or volunteer with us here.